

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

SUBJECT: NIE, Greco-Turkish Balance of Power (C/NF)

16 October 87

FROM: MAJ Dinella, USAITAC, AIAIT-AN, Ext 863-3761

TO: CAPT Holme

1. (S/NF) The NIE, as it has developed to date, points to the following conclusions:
 - a. A military balance between Greece and Turkey exists in the Aegean and Thrace.
 - (1) It is unlikely that either Greece or Turkey could make substantial gains against each other in Thrace. In the event of a Greco-Turkish war, of even short duration, the potential for particularly costly battles in terms of personnel and equipment losses to both sides can be expected in Thrace -- with neither side gaining any substantial advantage or territory.
 - (2) Greece can likely defend all of its (6) major Aegean islands against even a determined Turkish attempt to seize one of them. Casualties on both sides can be expected to be high.
 - (3) The potential exists for Turkey to seize one of the smaller Aegean islands. A likely target would be the small island of Kastellorizon. The seizure of territory by either side would make an Aegean war much more difficult to bring to a rapid conclusion by US/NATO political means.
 - (4) In the Aegean, Greece appears to have the advantage over Turkey in the air and at sea. This partially accounts for the bravado exhibited by Greece in the Marfih 1987 crisis.
 - (5) Neither side wants a Greco-Turkish war. However, Greece, as demonstrated in March 1987, is much less likely to back out of a potential conflict situation -- especially in the Aegean -- than it has ever been in the past.
 - b. (S/NF) Turkey has, and will continue to retain the military/political advantage on Cyprus.
 - (1) Other than to go to war with Turkey in Thrace and the Aegean, Greece cannot defend southern Cyprus against a determined Turkish attack.
 - (2) In the event of war on Cyprus, casualties on both sides, but especially in southern Cyprus can be expected to be high in military, civilian, and property losses. Turkey will prevail.
 - (3) In the event of a Greco-Turkish war in the Aegean, the likelihood of a Turkish advance into southern Cyprus will increase dramatically -- especially if Turkey suffers heavy casualties in the Aegean.
 - (4) The Turkish force levels on Cyprus represent a moderating factor for Athens in consideration of a Greco-Turkish conflict in the Aegean.
 - c. (S/NF) It is expected that the military balance which currently exists between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean will begin to shift in Turkey's favor over the next decade. Simply stated, Greece cannot keep it up over the long haul.

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

SECRET NOFORN

NIE, Greco-Turkish Balance of Power (C/NF)


16 October 1987

- (1) Greece is beginning to feel increasingly uncomfortable with its ability to successfully attack Turkish facilities in Western Anatolia due to increased numbers of Turkish aircraft from Canada, the USA, and the FRG. Also, the appearance of Rapier at Turkish air bases significantly diminishes the chances of successful air attacks against these important Turkish facilities.
- (2) Turkey, like Greece, continues to modernize its military forces. Turkey has significantly more M48A5 tanks than Greece and is expected to embark upon an ambitious artillery/APC upgrade.
- (3) Turkey will have double or more the number of high-performance F-16 aircraft than Greece by the mid-1990s.
- (4) The Turkish Navy will undergo a significant modernization (new ships) throughout the 1990s.

2. (S/NF) The US and the FRG should consider FMS/MAP assistance to Greece and Turkey in terms of providing equipment to each side that enhances the overall effectiveness of the respective military forces against the potential Pact threat while simultaneously enhancing the effectiveness of the deterrent that each side can present to the other in terms of a possible Greco-Turkish war.

- (1) Greece is paranoid over the security of its islands and its territory in Thrace. Additional and more effective anti-tank weapons and ADA systems would tend to make Greece feel more comfortable.
- (2) Turkey is likely uncomfortable with the potential of the Greek Air Force to conduct operations over Turkish territory. Additional ADA systems would put Turkey more at ease and simultaneously reinforce current Greek perceptions that the potential effectiveness of their ability to conduct cross-border operations with their aircraft has decreased.

3. (S/NF) The potential for a Greco-Turkish war in the Aegean will diminish substantially in the event of resolution of one or more of the Aegean disputes or in the event of a settlement of the Cyprus problem. This will probably not occur within the next decade. Greece is more likely than Turkey to be the initiator of hostilities. As Turkey gets stronger over the next decade the probability of Greece initiating hostilities will likely decrease.



HARRY D. DINELLA
MAJ, QMC
NATO Branch

SECRET NOFORN