Academic Güvenç: We might see further isolation of Turkey

By Today Zaman

While foes have become friends of Turkey, its friends have become foes toward the end of 2015. Do Turkey and Israel need each other, as President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan puts it? What else should Turkey expect from the worsening of relations with Russia? What about Turkey’s red lines in Syria; are they likely to be crossed in 2016?

This week’s guest for Monday Talk says if decision-makers do not face “the fast-changing realities on the ground and adjust accordingly,” the situation might be much worse in 2016 than in 2015 for Turkey, both domestically and internationally.

“We might also see further isolation of Turkey and loneliness — I don’t think it will be a ‘precious loneliness.’ Isolation and loneliness have never been nice,” said Serhat Güvenç, a professor of international relations.

“A couple of years ago, Ankara expressed ambitious objectives that Turkey would set the order in the Middle East. Now, looking at the current situation, Turkey has been growingly isolated. It has become an isolated actor and an easy target, especially after its entanglement with Russia,” Güvenç also said.

Answering our questions on the expected foreign policy developments in 2016, Güvenç elaborated on the issues.

What do you think are the most important foreign policy issues that will keep decision-makers occupied in 2016?

2015 was a difficult year and full of challenges for Turkey. 2016 will be marked by a shift from single-issue foreign policy. For the last couple of years, Turkish foreign policymakers have been sucked into the Syrian issue that dominated the foreign policy agenda of Turkey. After the recent standoff between Turkey and Russia in Syria, Ankara reached the limits of unilateral action and what it could pull off in Syria. This naturally compelled decision-makers to reconsider their priorities. And there will be other issues that would require attention after being on the backburner for years. In the first half of 2016, we will be talking about the Cyprus issue. There will probably be the last-ever effort to reunite and normalize the island. We will probably be engaged in a heated debate on the pros and cons of a new framework for a solution on the island. If Turkish and Greek Cypriots vote in favor of a new plan to reunify the island, this will signify a paradigm shift in Turkish-Greek relations, Turkey-Cyprus relations and Turkey’s relations with the European Union.

You just mentioned Turkey’s relations with Russia, also connected to the issue of Syria. What would you expect on that side?

Despite optimistic statements from the Turkish side, I do not see a quick recovery on Turkey-Russia relations. It will take some time to establish the same kind of relations enjoyed in the last decade of the post-Cold War era. Retrospectively, we will probably say the 10 years were an exception because geopolitical rivalry is back in the game. The conflict seems to be relatively managed; I don’t anticipate a major crisis. Russia is too strong for Turkey to take on its own. Therefore, Turkey will increasingly rely on its Western partners and Western security structures, NATO in particular. As far as Syria is concerned, Turkey is boxed in by Russia and its NATO allies. Russia has ruled out Turkey’s involvement in the Syrian theater; therefore, this reduced a potential conflict between the two countries over Syria. Russia has been militarily Turkey’s strongest neighbor to the North and has become the militarily strongest neighbor in the South as well. This will lead Turkish decision-makers to be more cautious in dealing with Russia, and I expect more reliance on the traditional security system Turkey has been part of for decades.

What are your thoughts on the economic aspects of relations with Russia?

Economically speaking, Turkey might benefit from the recent tension in the mid and long-term because this was a reminder to decision-makers that such an asymmetry in economic interdependence with Russia is not working in favor of Turkey. So, Turkey will be compelled to diversify its energy sources and suppliers. But in the short-term, we might have problems regarding energy supply from Russia. So far, [Vladimir] Putin has taken measures to punish Turkey but ultimately we don’t know what he has in mind. We don’t yet know what his political objective is. That remains to be seen.

‘Turkey has lost its honest broker status, its benign actor identity’

Many observers have been saying Turkey is circled by hostile countries. What is your opinion in this regard?

We are used to such analyses. In the 1990s, the idea was that Turkey might find itself in a two-and-a-half front war: with Greece in the West; Syria in the South; and the [Kurdistan Workers’ Party] PKK in the Southeast. Unfortunately, this dangerous mindset has made a spectacular comeback. What is different today compared to the 1990s is that the West was considered part of this hostile encirclement; today, it is mainly Russia and its regional partners. I’m not saying Turkey is surrounded by a network of hostile countries, but I’d say Turkey’s access to certain parts of its neighborhood has been seriously crippled by a number of regimes and governments that are not sympathetic to Turkey’s current administration.

In this environment, do you expect Ankara’s influence to increase or decrease with regards to regional developments?

It depends on Turkey’s style in foreign policy. When Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu visited Belgrade recently, he was not welcomed, in contrast to his past visits. Serbia has special ties with Russia so in an incident involving Turkey and Russia, it is natural to expect them to side with Russia; there is nothing unexpected here but the language used by the Serbian prime minister was surprising since it was quite overt. Some Turkish observers linked this to Turkey’s attempts to appeal to religious groups in the Balkans and this probably did not go well with the Serbian government. Turkey used to be perceived as a country with benign objectives in the Balkans; it was able to talk to any sides in conflicts without being dragged in but now it is increasingly seen as being part of the conflicts in the region. Turkey has lost its honest broker status, its benign actor identity. A couple of years ago, Ankara expressed ambitious objectives that Turkey would set the order in the Middle East. Now, looking at the current situation, Turkey has been growingly isolated. It has become an isolated actor and an easy target, especially after its entanglement with Russia.

‘Tough rhetoric has a price tag’

Do you think Turkey’s increasing isolation and loss of credibility in the region is a result of its own foreign policy mistakes or something else?

This outcome is a dangerous combination of one, an abrupt change in the regional balance of power, especially Russia’s introduction into the regional equilibrium; second, domestic developments in Turkey — authoritarian tendencies and too much association of domestic priorities with foreign policy; and finally, choices that individuals have made. Many times, President Erdoğan referred to his close relations with Putin. The tough foreign policy rhetoric used in domestic politics has come with a price tag.

This is quite a dramatic change as Ankara expressed its zero problems with neighbors policy and adopted a soft-power approach more than 10 years ago, isn’t this?

It has evolved from “zero problems with neighbors” to “zero neighbors without problems” now.

Does this spell more problems in 2016?

It depends on whether or not key decision-makers will make fundamental reassessment of the tools, instruments, objectives and priorities of foreign policy. The signs have not been promising in this regard. If decision-makers decide to stick to what they have been doing so far in Syria and Iraq, the situation might get worse and we might see a worsening of relations with regional actors and Russia. We might also see further isolation of Turkey and loneliness — I don’t think it will be a “precious loneliness.” Isolation and loneliness have never been nice. This is indeed what Turkish policymakers have been trying to avoid in international relations, although Turkey has found itself isolated a number of times, especially in times of transition from one international order to another. In this regard, Turkish decision-makers have been slow to grasp the dynamics of change but they eventually caught up. I’d like to be an optimist and say although there is a delay in their response, Turkish foreign policy decision-makers will finally catch up with the fast-changing realities on the ground and adjust accordingly. Otherwise, 2016 is likely to be more difficult for Turkey in both domestic and foreign policy fronts.

‘Baghdad wants to put an end to Turkey’s military presence in Iraq’

I’d like to mention a few developments in recent weeks regarding Turkey’s relations in the region. In the last days of the 2015, the Iraqi prime minister accused Turkey of failing to respect an agreement to withdraw its troops from the country’s north, particularly from Bashiqa, and its foreign minister said, if necessary, Iraq could resort to military action to defend its sovereignty. There are many countries that have troops in Iraq; why is the Iraqi administration, backed by Washington in this regard, bothered by Turkish troop presence now?

From a military perspective I read an interesting piece by my colleague Dr. Akın Ünver, who made a reference to the Fulda Gap [a strategic corridor in Germany during the Cold War] in his article “Mosul: Turkey’s Fulda Gap.” He argued it is necessary for Turkey to keep a military presence in key locations in Iraq to keep the PKK in check and reduce its ability to launch attacks in Turkey. Ten years ago, Turkey had red lines in Iraq with respect to Iraq’s territorial integrity. Now, it seems like Turkey and the United States have flip flopped positions. Obviously, Turkey would not be bothered if northern Iraq became an independent Kurdish state whereas Washington emphasizes Iraq’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. The legitimate representative of the Iraqi government in Baghdad is not really close to Turkey because Turkey has been caught in a sectarian rift in the region and has been considered as belonging to the other side, and Baghdad wants to put an end to the Turkey’s military presence in Iraq. There is a legitimacy problem, too, here. The statement by the Arab League with regards to the Turkish troops’ deployment says it is an “assault on Iraq’s sovereignty” while the central government in Baghdad calls Turkey’s military presence in Bashiqa an “invasion.” Baghdad did not have its wording approved by the Arab League. The fate of Iraq has been decided and it’s a move to deny Turkey the leverage that it could influence the reshaping of Iraq and Syria. Before 2016 is out, we will probably see changes in Iraq agreed with consensus of global and regional powers. This is clearly an attempt to deny Turkey an influence in the process, or at least to minimize Turkey’s influence.

Would it be correct to say Turkey will not have much of an influence in efforts to reshape the region?

If Ankara continues this way, it will have to settle with a much-reduced window of opportunity to shape events. Turkey’s competitive edge in this context is not its military power. Its competitive edge was its economy, its vibrant civil society and its EU candidacy. We have lost most of that. A quick revival of the EU membership process can help Turkey have some influence in the process as a benign contributor. But when it relies on its military means, then it is usually regarded as a security consumer rather than a security provider in the region. A serious recalibration of Turkish foreign policy is needed, and prospects of improved relations with Israel might be a sign in this direction.

Is this why Turkey is trying to mend its relations with Israel?

There are simple geopolitical needs. One consistent element of President Barack Obama’s policy in the Middle East was Iran’s reintroduction into the international community. We might see Iran reaping the benefits of normalization. When Iran is back in the international system, Israel’s and Turkey’s relative weights, especially in the West, will decrease. So the two sides, despite their ideological differences, are making great strides to improve their relations. And as Russia has been militarily very active in regions around Turkey and has a naval presence in the Black Sea, Turkey needs warships to balance Russia. The US administration had earmarked two frigates to be delivered to Turkey but took it out of the resolution in view of the Israeli lobby’s objections. In the near future, the US administration will renew this request and Turkey needs the Israeli lobby on its side for that.

‘Turkey’s red lines likely to be crossed in Syria’

Another development in the last weeks of 2015 has been the advance by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) by capturing the strategically important Tishrin Dam on the Euphrates. The SDF, supported by the US, is now targeting Raqqa, referred to as ISIL’s capital. In addition, the UN Security Council in December passed a US-sponsored resolution that puts forward a roadmap to facilitate a transition within Syria to an inclusive government. Do you see peace at the end of the road with regards to Syria?

Not peace but we may see Turkey’s red lines being crossed in Syria in the first weeks of 2016. The forces are not moving West –Turkey’s red line — but are moving from the South. Turkey’s worst expectation is likely to materialize and Syrian Kurds are likely to control territories there. As for the international developments regarding Syria, there is room for cautious optimism since there is ambiguity regarding who will be considered legitimate actors in the Syrian opposition and who will be taken out of the scene. Once this is sorted out, we might see growing agreement on a more coordinated effort to sweep Syria off those undesired elements — jihadists, al-Qaeda and ISIL-affiliated elements. There may not be peace according to our understanding of the word, but we may see a semblance of stability and from that, a political process may build up. And again, if it goes on like this, Turkey will not be able to have any contribution in the final outcome.

When talking about Turkey’s red lines in Syria, you are referring to the Kurdish issue and Turkey’s response. How do you explain it?

What is taking place in the Southeast can be considered Turkey’s response to the emergence of a potential Kurdish region between Turkey and Syria in the near future. Turkey might be bracing for what might happen in Syria — another Kurdish entity next door. Turkey will be insulated from Iraq and Syria by this new Kurdish entity and is trying to reduce spillover from this new entity to Turkey. Turkey’s Western partners have been keeping quiet so far regarding human rights issues and its handling of the situation in the Southeast but as civilian casualties mount, we might see criticism from Western capitals in the future. Pressure on Turkey may mount to find a political solution to its Kurdish problem. If its Kurdish predicament continues this way, it will be very difficult for Turkey, if not impossible, to win hearts and minds of its Kurdish population. We are sliding very fast in that direction. There might not be any hearts and minds left to win at the end of the day.

PROFILE

Serhat Güvenç

Currently a professor of international relations at Kadir Has University, his research and teaching interests include Turkish foreign policy, European integration and security, diplomatic and military history. He received his bachelor’s and master’s degrees from Marmara University, and a Ph.D. in political science and international relations from Boğaziçi University. He has authored three books, “Osmanlıların Drednot Düşleri” (The Ottomans’ Quest for Dreadnoughts; İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları 2009), “Turkey in the Mediterranean during the Interwar Era” (Indiana University Turkish Studies, 2010, with Dilek Barlas) and “NATO’da 60 Yıl: Türkiye’nin Transatlantik Güvenliğe Katkıları” (60 Years in NATO: Turkey’s Contributions to Transatlantic Security; İstanbul Bilgi University, 2013). Professor Güvenç is a board member of the Foundation of Lausanne Treaty Emigrants.